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Abstract:
In this work I address creativity in the process of social sciences research, comparing quantitative and qualitative approaches. In
discussing creativity I go back to Chomsky and his distinction between rule-governed and rule-changing creativity. In my analysis I
suggest that the quantitative approach is characterized by rule-governed creativity, the qualitative one by rule-changing creativity:
these are two models of creativity that the Chomskian vision links to a set of rules. us in the ﬁrst case the creation of the tools by
which the researcher collects information is submitted to a set of rules related to substantial and procedural competences. In the
second case the creative phase does not have a place in the creation of a tool, but rather in a performance. e idea of performance as
a constitutive part in qualitative research is analysed on a substantial basis, revealing the implications of distinct creative processes
under diﬀerent methodological choices. Whilst a quantitative approach requires using procedural and substantial competences,
I suggest that in a qualitative enquiry the researcher’s ﬁeldwork is considered as a ‘performance’ because of its adaptive character.
e researcher is constantly confronted with unforeseen situations, surrounded by an unknown environment. Also, this use of
the notion of ‘performance’ comprehends both elements of the process as well as of the outcome of ﬁeldwork, as it recalls peculiar
characteristics of qualitative work: action and interaction, personal involvement and, above all, orientation to a purpose (in this
context, the teleological purpose of knowledge production).
Keywords: Social research methodology, Creativity, Quantitative approach, Qualitative approach.
Resumen:
En este trabajo abordo la creatividad en el proceso de investigación de las ciencias sociales, comparando los enfoques cuantitativos
y cualitativos. Al hablar de creatividad, vuelvo a Chomsky y a su distinción entre rule-governed y rule-changing creativity. En mi
análisis, sugiero que el enfoque cuantitativo se caracteriza por rule-governed creativity, la cualitativa por rule-changing creativity:
estos son dos modelos de creatividad que la visión chomskiana vincula con un conjunto de reglas. Así, en el primer caso, la creación
de las herramientas mediante las cuales el investigador recopila información se somete a un conjunto de reglas relacionadas con
competencias sustanciales y de procedimiento. En el segundo caso, la fase creativa no sucede en la creación de una herramienta,
sino en un rendimiento. La idea de desempeño como parte constitutiva en la investigación cualitativa se analiza de manera
sustancial, revelando las implicaciones de distintos procesos creativos bajo diferentes elecciones metodológicas. Si bien un enfoque
cuantitativo requiere el uso de competencias sustanciales y de procedimiento, sugiero que en una investigación cualitativa el
trabajo de campo del investigador se considera un “rendimiento” debido a su carácter adaptativo. El investigador se enfrenta
constantemente a situaciones imprevistas, rodeado de un entorno desconocido. Además, este uso de la noción de “desempeño”
abarca tanto los elementos del proceso, como el resultado del trabajo de campo, al recordar características peculiares del trabajo
cualitativo: acción e interacción, participación personal y, sobre todo, orientación hacia un propósito (en este contexto, el propósito
teleológico de la producción de conocimiento).
Palabras clave: Metodología de las ciencias sociales, Creatividad, Enfoque cuantitativo, Enfoque cualitativo.
1. Introduction
    In social sciences it is possible to distinguish two research approaches that are widely debated. e ﬁrst 
one conceives the world along a number of variables and aims at analysing the association between them;
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the second one is devoted to the holistic comprehension of speciﬁc social realities. is obviously lays the
foundations for debate between quantitative and qualitative approach1. One of the limits usually attributed
to the qualitative approach is the lack of an operational deﬁnition, a structured and controllable search
scheme. e attempt then becomes to reformulate the opposition between quantitative and qualitative
approach by talking about two forms of creativity. One is a real creativity, the other takes the form of
dexterity. A distinctive feature of qualitative research is to harmonize their research practices with the context
in which they apply (Cardano, 2014) and this exercise of constant harmonization is the way in which this
creativity is exercised. e indeterminateness of some tools becomes a resource: in this frame, recalling the
sensitizing concepts is very eﬀective. e sensitizing concept is rich precisely because of its openness, Blumer
speaks about “undeﬁned concepts” having in mind the operational deﬁnition, is not a not yet mature concept,
but is a concept that wants to be open to meet the unexpected. Actually, sensitizing concepts are not the
starting point for qualitative research alone, but for research in general. Just the building of a cognitive
pathway that has within it the opportunity to show the researcher “an otherwise” (Cardano, 2014), qualiﬁes
it as a research path out of the closure.
In the brief space of this article I will only touch some of the concepts related to the above-mentioned
debate. e speciﬁc purpose here is to link the research process in the social sciences with the dimension of
creativity. Rather than addressing creativity as an ordering property of chaos - as it happens in a number or
contributions on cosmogony (Arlow, 1982; Bonnefoy, 1992) - or as an exclusive property of genius oen
associated to dissolute living and eccentricity, I look at creativity as a property belonging to every single
human being (Chomsky, 1964; Amabile, 2001).
2. What about Creativity
    e notion of creativity is linked to a human being's property that is oen not well deﬁned. In this paper 
I will use two meanings of creativity: one comes from the Latin word creàre, which subtends to the idea of 
creation from nothing, as suggested by the Jewish-Christian tradition, where the divine accomplishes 
creation in a linear way (it had a beginning and an end). e other one comes from the Greek word kraίnό, 
meaning to produce or to complete, from which derives another word, krantòr, which means dominator, and 
kreίòn, the one who makes, the one who creates. In the etymology of the word “creation” we ﬁnd the Greek 
term Κράντωρ (Krantòr), the name of a Dolope given in hostage to Peleo and became his favorite squire; 
it is a nomen agentis derived from the verb κραìνω, “accomplish”, “realize”; it means “the one who realizes” 
and that, therefore, it also becomes “master”, “sovereign”, “dominator”. In the Greek etymology the action 
of creation is strictly connected to the domination of something that allows to create; nevertheless Greeks 
had a circular conception of motion structures and time (Gobo and Tota, 1994), that suggests the idea of 
transformation instead of a creation from nothing.
e etymologies of the word help us to understand why Chomsky (1964) speaks about creativity instead
of productivity when referring to the human being's ability to formulate and to understand new sentences in
accord with a grammar. He distinguishes between rule-changing creativity and rule-governed creativity (p. 22).
e distinction pertains to linguistic production regarding grammar rules: an individual could be creative
by means of changing the language in some ways (ﬁrst type), or because although she or he does not modify
the language, she or he rather understands it and produces new sentences (second type). In the ﬁrst case the
property concerns a creation that brakes with what has been up to that particular moment. It is an act that
bypasses established rules and constitutes something original, which did not exist before in that ambit (which
reminds us of the Latin meaning). I will link this form of creativity to the qualitative approach. In contrast, I
will refer to rule-governed creativity (linking it back to the Greek meaning) in relation with the quantitative
approach; it is an application of rules that come from both substantive and procedural knowledge.
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In the next sections I suggest in what respect the Chomskian dyad can help to identify the creative
aspect of research as a constituent and normal part of the knowledge production process. Contextually,
I will propose creativity as being a property of both quantitative and qualitative research approaches: the
substantial diﬀerences, I argue, regard when, in what phase of knowledge production creativity is particularly
necessary and how it is expressed. I then apply my considerations to the diﬀerent treatments of creativity
in research, looking at the plurality of structures that research design may assume, reﬂecting the researcher’s
decision to adopt a quantitative or qualitative approach.
3. The echoes of Krantòr in the quantitative approach
    Bickman (1976) deﬁnes structuring as a continuum along which it is possible to set up the observational 
tools. On the le-hand extreme of this continuum there are those tools4 by which, in the design phase, 
one deﬁnes clearly and not ambiguously what to observe. is allows a comfortable comparison among 
diﬀerent observations. Moving to the right-hand side of the continuum, the degree of freedom with which 
the researcher observes increases. So the researcher will be free to collect every event she or he considers 
interesting in order to gain information.
I would also underline that to deﬁne a data collection scheme with diﬀerent degrees of rigidity depends
on the establishment of more or less constraining rules that the researcher shall follow. For example, in a
completely structured data collection scheme the researcher would indicate what to observe, how to observe
it and how to record it. is is generally the case in which the researcher adopts a quantitative approach,
which would be eﬀective once one disposes of a satisfying knowledge of the research object. In this case, from
a research-design point of view, when the object studied and the theory are deﬁned, the researcher would
formulate the hypothesis (that will be checked during data analysis5) as well as the model speciﬁcation. She
or he proceeds then to set up a sampling plan - which ideally should be random in order to make inferential
procedures on research results possible - on the basis of those proprieties which have to be representative.
Aer these steps, she or he operationally deﬁnes all the properties of the object studied. is consists in giving
a set of rules that allow her or him to transform the attributes of an object into the modalities of a variable.
Data collection and matrix data entering would follow, entering into data analysis, hypothesis control and
concluding with results communication.
According to the quantitative approach, the researcher can operationally deﬁne properties in order to
build up a set of variables and, subsequently, organise data in a matrix. is process is consistent with the
speciﬁcation of the model, which includes both its properties, as well as the hypothesised relationships
between them.
is can be identiﬁed as the ﬁrst creative phase of the quantitative approach: relying on the strength
of the knowledge acquired about the problem, the researcher deﬁnes which properties are relevant for his
aims. She or he then creates a model which takes into account both a vision of reality and formal aspects
of deﬁnition, depending on the purpose of his research. is ability to move dely between reality and the
necessary reduction of complexity inside a model needs particular cognitive eﬀort: it requires the application
of theoretical knowledge about relationships between properties in a model that presupposes a cognition, or
at least a hypothesis, about the direction of relationships.
Once the model has been speciﬁed, the researcher enters in the second creative phase; in this case properties
are deﬁned in a more operative way. According to Marradi (2007: 107) an operational deﬁnition is “the set
of rules and conventions that allow to transform a property into a variable inside a matrix”6. He also suggests
that those conventions regard not only every single property, but also every new research. Especially in social
sciences, where shared and inter-subjective deﬁnitions are not so common, the researcher has a wide margin
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to express his creativity despite the fact of working with an approach (the quantitative one) that is historically
considered objective and characterized by a low level of inﬂuence of the knowing subject.
For example, the use of diﬀerent types of scale (e.g. a Likert scale rather than a feeling thermometer)
to collect states on a property, rather than a more or less sensitive plan of codiﬁcation7, are all due to the
choice mediated by the researcher’s creativity, when she or he applies his competences to a new object of
enquiry. is vision of the process does not brake the orderliness claim of the quantitative approach, but
nor does it underestimate the creative role of the researcher during the process of model speciﬁcation and
operational deﬁnition. e latter impacts on the whole research and reﬂects the researcher’s creative eﬀort
as an expression of what I would name, following Chomsky (1964), rule-governed creativity.
Building on Chomsky (1964), I propose an interpretation of research according to which the creative
act supposes both substantial and procedural competences, which allows us to operatively deﬁne properties
and to transform them into variables. is type of creativity is strongly related to the common practice of
problem solving based on the logic of learned rules. Here the warning of Krantòr (the dominator) echoes
strongly: in this case the dominion concerns what is known, that means the capacity to describe and question
it in a appropriate way depending on a satisfying degree of previous knowledge (etic perspective). e creative
phase concretely leads, on the one hand, to the construction of the collection tool, which takes place before
the gathering of information. On the other hand, it oﬀers the advantage of proposing a testable hypothesis,
as previously deﬁned variables are analysed. e representation of reality – and its correspondence to the
collected information – is the major issue here, because the creative eﬀort must work within the established
rules. Conformity to existing rules allows us to deconstruct results and build upon them once the original
research tool has run out of its collection function.
4. Definitive or sensitive Tools
   It is not always possible to think of aparticular phenomenon and objects a priori: for example, the 
relevant “codiﬁed knowledge” (Polanyi, 1958) could be unavailable, available only partially, or obsolete 
(Cowan, David and Foray, 2000). In these cases model speciﬁcation is impossible or inoperative, following 
of the quantitative approach criteria. According to Nigris (2003) such an outcome could even be the 
conscious choice of not structuring when one recognises “the excess of what is knowable over what is 
known, mainly by avoiding the supposition of holding right at the beginning the whole set of concepts 
concerning the description of the observed world”8 (p. 42). Starting from these assumptions, the use of a 
highly structured tool is not always a viable research strategy. By eventually overestimating the available 
knowledge, the researcher runs the risk of behaving – to recall an old Jewish saying – “like the nocturnal 
drunkard who searches for his lost keys under a street light because that is where they are easier to 
see” (Piore and Sabel, 1984: 222). e light of the “quantitative streetlamp” is bright but also strictly 
focused on that speciﬁc part of reality on which the researcher directed it. All the things that fall outside 
the light run the risk of being ignored, making the research useless.
Diﬀerently, in an unstructured data collection scheme the researcher tries to be led by people’s narration,
and therefore leaves them free to picture the world at their level of comprehension. In this context the
researcher has to ﬁnd the way that she or he considers the most appropriate. Because of the complexity of
reality and the narrowness of individuals’ knowledge (Hayek, 1945), in some cases it is not possible to acquire
previous knowledge about the object of research. is is, for instance, the case of local phenomena, whose
knowledge has never been codiﬁed in any form. Nevertheless a low structuring tool is advisable when the
object reﬂects issues that are diﬃcult to observe, such as personal relationships or, more critically, people’s
point of view (emic perspective). e whole strand of qualitative studies comes from considerations of that
kind and ﬁnds its application building on the assumption that an individual is able to argue about his everyday
life. e researcher’s task is then to arrange a low structured research tool, one that would leave to the speaker
Relmecs, junio-noviembre 2019, vol. 9, no. 1, e049, ISSN 1853-7863
5
the possibility to express her or himself with his own words and at his level of comprehension (Montesperelli,
1998).
e aim is to recognise in the subject a better awareness of his own environment, as compared to the
researcher’s. For example, a community that decides to live in a radically diﬀerent way from the rest of society
is hard to investigate a priori, not least because of the poor contextual knowledge that the researcher has
of that world. For these reasons considering, for example, the technique of in-depth interview, it will be
desirable that the subjects lead the trajectory and the unfolding of interviews. e researcher steps in only
when the interview is protracted in some uninteresting ways that are recognised as being useless for the
research aims. is allows, especially in preliminary steps, to use, or to ﬁx, “sensitizing concepts” around
which to focus the attention during later interviews, other than introducing the researcher to a new way
of thinking, which is diﬀerent from his own and from his mental categories. e expression “sensitizing
concepts” was coined by Blumer (1969), by which he means those concepts that prepare the researcher to
perception, to follow some ways instead of some others, that focus his attention on speciﬁc issues or situations
during the development of the research:
I think that thoughtful study shows conclusively that the concepts of our discipline are fundamentally sensitizing
instruments. Hence, I call them "sensitizing concepts" and put them in contrast with deﬁnitive concepts such as I have been
referring to in the foregoing discussion. A deﬁnitive concept refers precisely to what is common to a class of objects, by the
aid of a clear deﬁnition in terms of attributes or ﬁxed bench marks. is deﬁnition, or the bench marks, serves as a means
of clearly identifying the individual instance of the class and the make-up of that instance that is covered by the concept.
A sensitizing concept lacks such speciﬁcation of attributes or bench marks and consequently it does not enable the user to
move directly to the instance and its relevant content. Instead, it gives the user a general sense of reference and guidance
in approaching empirical instances. Whereas deﬁnitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts
merely suggest directions along which to look. (…) ey lack precise reference and have no bench marks which allow a clean-
cut identiﬁcation of a speciﬁc instance and of its content. Instead, they rest on a general sense of what is relevant. ere can
scarcely be any dispute over this characterization” (pp. 49-150).
Starting from sensitizing instruments, the level of structuring of the scheme can change during the research
development but, as Cozzi and Nigris (2003) notice, it can only get higher. At the beginning of the research,
if the study object is not well known, the observer lets events lead his involvement. Diﬀerently, at the end of
the explorative work when she or he knows more about the object of his study, if necessary, she or he might
decide to adopt a more structured data collection scheme. Having gone through these stages, the researcher
can examine the world through learnt categories, or can build a model based on learnt knowledge, therefore
being in a position to undertake simulations9.
5. Creàre: the cognitive restructuration in the qualitative approach
    Ina quantitative approach, the researcher moves inside a complex set of rules with which she or he is 
confronted when using his creativity. Diﬀerently, the qualitative approach is not based on a set of procedures 
or necessary and sequential steps that the researcher has to follow to set up and use his own gathering tools. 
Moving from the assumption that knowledge is not adequate to describe a certain portion of reality, what 
qualitative research really tackles is the cognitive eﬀort to understand mental categories of other subjects and 
how they see their world.
e key driver of qualitative approaches remains on an implicit level: whatever the reason for its not being
possible to have suﬃcient knowledge, the researcher has to tackle the issues of inaccessibility of information
and of lack of comprehension when designing research. e qualitative approach allows us to break those
impasses. By entering into the ﬁeld, the researcher interacts, experiences directly how people live, what their
practices and habits of thought are, as well as what mental categories they use to give sense to reality. is
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allows her or him to deﬁne problems on the strength of a new and pertinent knowledge that does not belong
to people who live in an external context.
Diﬀerently, whilst a quantitative approach requires using procedural and substantial competences, I
suggest that in a qualitative enquiry the researcher’s ﬁeldwork is considered as a ‘performance’ because of
its adaptive character. e researcher is constantly confronted with unforeseen situations, surrounded by
an unknown environment. Also, this use of the notion of ‘performance’ comprehends both elements of
the process as well as of the outcome of ﬁeldwork, as it recalls peculiar characteristics of qualitative work:
action and interaction, personal involvement and, above all, orientation to a purpose (in this context, the
teleological purpose of knowledge production). According to Turner (1982):
Performance (...) is derived from the Middle English parfournen, later parfourmen, wich is itself from the old French
parfournir – par (‘thoroughly’) plus fournir (‘to furnish’) – hence performance does not necessarily have the structuralist
implication of manifesting form, but rather the processual sense of ‘bringing to completion’ or ‘accomplishing’. To perform
is thus to complete a more or less involved process rather than to do a single deed or act. To perform ethnography, then, is
to bring the data home to us in their fullness, in the plenitude of their action-meaning (p. 91).
In this sense, it is also possible to deﬁne performance as a creative process by which the researcher
experiences the mental categories of the studied people. is characteristic is absolutely central: in this case
the creative aspect does not develop by applying a set of rules, but unfolds through a sort of crossing-over in
which interaction is always a relationship that starts something new (knowledge in this case). According to
Turner (1982: 79) the idea of performance takes the form of a process and not of “rules or rubrics”. Rules
here are mainly functional to the framing of the process, because “a river needs banks or it will be a dangerous
ﬂood, but banks without a river epitomize aridity.”
In this context, a researcher’s creativity is expressed in a diﬀerent way, through a process that involves
the deepest aspects of personal and social life. She or he follows the Latin meaning of the term creativity,
as the creation of something that did not exist before (new mental categories). is is possible through the
process of cognitive restructuration that does not follow steps to control hypothesis, but that proceeds in
an experiential level. Restructuring is a creative act that gestaltists called ‘insight’ (German: Einsicht, literally
‘see inside’, but also ‘glimpse’ in the sense of a solution). Insight means to see inside a problem, to grasp the
functional relationships between the elements, between the relationships in a situation, to ﬁnally solve it
with a cognitive act of “restructuring”. Cognition is located there, in the relationship between mind and the
world (Anolli and Legrenzi, 2006) and it is based on achieving understanding into a situation and which
sometimes comes about suddenly, in an Aha! or Eureka! experience (Weisberg, 2015).
e frame by which the researcher interprets actions and behaviours changes. She or he begins accessing
interpretations of realty that she or he could not think of earlier. In this case, she or he refers to what Chomsky
(1964) deﬁnes as rule-changing creativity. e performance process is the one which leads the researcher to call
into question his way of interpreting a particular portion of reality, and to change his interpretation when
achieving the comprehension of the mental categories of subjects with whom she or he gets in touch. rough
a cognitive restructuration we act the rule-changing creativity: it is the conceptual frame that changes, which
modiﬁes itself, and allows us to reposition situations, thoughts, and interpretations of the social reality.
From another point of view, in social sciences performance processes may entail diﬀerent levels of
interaction, involvement and engagement. is implies building trust with the people the researcher interacts
with, to understand what they expect from her or him, as well as what role people recognise her or him
playing. To face those issues means to manage unexpected situations, and this is never an issue of application
of rules, but is a relationship, a crossing-over.
e image and behaviour of the knowing subject certainly reﬂect the categorization she or he uses to
learn about the world. Such categories will be perceived and will inﬂuence the subjects studied, regardless
of whether the study entails a relationship with an interviewee, an interaction with a participant in a focus
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group, or a sharing of life with a group of people during ethnographic research. For example, commenting
on ethnography, Cardano (2003: 126) emphasises that:
Fieldwork starts with a particular rite of status inversion: the observer becomes the observed object by the ‘natives’ who,
from the few evidences oﬀered during initial encounters, legitimately try to understand whether, and to what extent, they
can trust him10.
Furthermore, ethnographic experience has a dialogical structure. Diving and participation in a form of
life is something with which we submit our interpretative categories and the product of our interpretive
work to the confrontation with others. Such (emic/ethic) confrontation should not be reduced to member
validation or host validation strategies so an interpretation of a cultural context is appropriate if it gets the
recognition of our participants/guests but we consider their reaction, which is typical of social sciences. It
is precisely because there is this ontological proximity between the one who observes and who is observed
that our speeches become something retrograde about the objects themselves and thus creates an element
of complexity.
6. A priori categories of unconscious level
    It would be misleading to think that the research activity will be void of problems at an heuristic level 
just by using a low level of structuring. Even in the extreme case in which the researcher could observe 
whatever aspect of reality, she or he cannot avoid - in the act of orienting his sight - scanning reality 
through his mental categories – perhaps unconsciously – and ﬁltering information collection. She or he 
cannot rid her or himself of what she or he is and has been, thus bringing with her or him a reference 
framework to interpret and recognize reality at an unconscious level. According to Alfred Schutz (1932) 
(Muzzetto, 1997) this means moving in a pre-logic level of consciousness, in which one brings back objects 
to known ‘typiﬁcation’.is process is placed into a deep level of conscious that works on automatisms. 
is leaves space for the possibility of turning to categories that the researcher already has, but which are not 
adequate to understand a new context. Still, in the early stages of research this seems to be unavoidable, for 
example when “we identify a speciﬁc [empirical] referent as the member of a class […] that we have already 
constituted (e.g. a table / a bicycle / a human face / a woman’s voice / a rock song / a nervous disorder)”11 
(Marradi, 2001: 13). e unconscious process by which one assigns a referent to a class is called by 
Aristotle (Posterior’s Analytics: II.19) “intuitive induction”. Cognitive psychologists call it categorization, 
whereas Schutz (1932; 1959), remarking on an ordering function of perceptive chaos that allows social 
interaction, uses the term ‘typiﬁcation’ (1932; 1959; cf. also Husserl, 1939).
Nevertheless, it is only with late post-positivism that observation of reality has come to be no longer
considered a cognitive activity that leads to a pure and incontrovertible awareness. e observation
process is inﬂuenced by the researcher’s cultural context, by perception and knowledge about psychological
mechanisms that lead actions and, in the end, by the modalities of the observation. us, observation is an
activity that collects information through the knowing subject. She or he will interpret the reality through
his categories that can be cultural, learned by means of socialisation, or learned by belonging to researcher’s
scientiﬁc community. e ﬁrst two can vary across individuals and inside the individual as well. Although
a scientiﬁc community has its own cultural and socialisation dimensions, there are aspects of the speciﬁc
categories of science which frame the world following more rigorous procedures: they are more stable,
less ambiguous, capable of allowing a satisfying shared observation. For these reasons, observed data stop
providing that certitude which has been a central linchpin in positivist thought. Rather, the reﬂection on how
theory penetrates in observation processes becomes central and underpins the thesis of theory ladenness12
(Hanson, 1958; Brewer and Lambert, 2001)
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Hanson (1958) undertakes a philosophical reﬂection about epistemological problems in the ﬁeld of
particle physics. He concludes that to perceive even an ordinary object of everyday life, it is not enough to see
it. Rather, human beings need to have a preliminary knowledge about it. Likewise, for an individual to obtain
information from perception, the objects encountered must be identiﬁed. To do so, the individual needs
access to a relevant set of information. Hanson gives some examples of objects that contemporary people
directly perceive because they are familiar to them, but that people of past generations would not recognise,
being extraneous to them. Hanson (1969) suggests that in seeing there is more than being blindingly obvious.
What an individual sees is what his consciousness and education allow her or him to see, and what she or he
learns about what he observes is not determined only by the object that she or he is looking at, but mainly
by what she or he already knows.
Aﬃrming that to hold from the beginning the whole set of categories which are needed for the correct
interpretation of a new context would mean having an omniscient mind (Hayek, 1945). Moreover, it wouls
mean deceiving ourselves with the belief of being able to observe free from any a priori category – even
unconscious – is equally absurd.
In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1781) argues that reason sees only what it produces by itself:
space, time and categories intervene in the phenomenon formation and the empirical data is constructed
transcendentally through the a priori functions of sensitivity and intellect. Also, following Simmel (1900;
1950) it is possible to consider a priori comprehension based on pre-formed categories. However, because
it is referred to as social reality, his idea of a priori does not seem to respect the ﬁxity which is typical of the
Kantian conception. e a priori by which the people recognise reality are modiﬁable by experience, they
depend from a space-temporal dimension, they can vary from individual to individual and also inside the
individual himself (Boudon, 1989; Migliozzi, 1996). is is a central process in that it allows the evolution of
mental categories through experience. Such a process implies that to establish a contact with the knowledge
shared by a group of people presupposes the willingness to open one’s self to learning, and a capacity to modify
one’s thought categories in evolutionary terms.
7. Rubbish or wrecks?
    In 2006 I conducted an ethnographic research in the Mutoids community based in Santarcangelo di 
Romagna, Italy. For six months I lived with them and shared the everyday life of this group of people. Mutoids 
are a small community composed of about 20 people who are based in an ex gravel pit in the suburbs of 
Santarcangelo, near Rimini, since 1990. e initial core of the community was created by people of English 
and Scottish origins, but other people from Italy joined the initial group later on. ey live in caravans or 
old buses that have been transformed into houses. “e Camp” is about 100 metres of not paved space 
where houses are disposed, lorries and cars are parked, and where wrecks that the group recycle are piled up. 
Members of the Mutoids live principally thanks to their recycling art, ‘mutating’ wrecks and other goods 
discarded by society into sculptures, mutant machines, installations, or doing performances inspired by a 
post-nuclear future. In the Camp’s main square a great monument rises up. It was constructed by the Mutoids 
when they arrived in the gravel pit and is made of two lorries knocked vertically in the ground. ey are 
linked together like a dolmen, but in a contemporary – post bombardment – version. Other sculptures are 
dispersed across the Camp and in front of the houses of their creators.
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Author photograph of the Mutoid’s Camp
e only way to study and understand a way of life which immediately seems to be so diﬀerent from the
mainstream one to which I belong, was to apply a qualitative research design. A questionnaire would not
have been an eﬀective tool to collect data about them. is is because of the diﬃculty and perhaps uselessness
of writing questions about a context that is radically unknown, following an etic cognitive perspective. e
categorial iato that separated me from a comprehension of their existence could be ﬁlled only with a direct
experience of their life.
For example in the ﬁrst period I spent in the ﬁeld I did not really understand the role of the wrecks and
other things jumbled in the Camp. I just did not wonder anything about them, I took them for granted,
like a naïf frame populated by this diﬀerent people. But this was a central issue that I did not recognise
immediately. I was too much concentrated on gaining their trust and on the avoidance of doing something
wrong, to pay attention to what was abundant in the Camp and which my mind recognised automatically as
rubbish. Rubbish: probably few things could have been more misleading. To illustrate, when Connie, one of
the Mutoids, invited me to her birthday party at the Camp, aer having celebrated all night, bottles, plastic
dishes and exploded balloons were jumbled all over the ground of the principal square. I had to go home to
sleep a couple of hours, but I promised myself to be back in the morning to help with the cleaning up. e
morning aer, when I arrived at the Camp, I was really surprised to ﬁnd that everything was neat and ordered.
ere were no signs pointing to the party of the night before: no bottles, no plastic dishes, not even a little
piece of waste paper lied down on the ground. I found that circumstance very strange. Why should people
who live surrounded by rubbish clean so fast and accurately aer a party? Something did not match with
my pre-existing habits of thinking and behaving. I could have ignored that contradiction, but something,
possibly intuition, suggested to me that there was some relevant element I did not guess.
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e only way to give sense to the whole situation was to state an hypothesis that (if true) explained as
normal the event that I could not understand at my level of comprehension. is is an abductive13 reasoning.
Because of its logic construction, this is the only inference that allows us to introduce new knowledge in
reasoning, to be more precise, that lead us to a conclusion that is not included in the premises.
at was the ﬁrst time I really understood the function of the wrecks jumbled all over the camp: It was
not ‘rubbish’ but the discards of society that the Mutoids pile up and then use as the prime material for their
houses, sculptures and performances, or for their everyday life.
Moreover, they are extremely sensitive to environmental issues: inside the community they practice the
separate collection of rubbish that they obviously produce and discard, and outside they collect things
that other people consider as rubbish, but they use to their necessities. I could not realize that without
experiencing their reality. Furthermore, I could not predispose a tool to collect data about something I could
not previously describe. e role of creativity, in this small example, was to change the rule though which
I looked at the Mutoids’ reality during the period I stayed in the ﬁeld, and to face every emerging task due
to the relationship with them.
8. Conclusions
    Beyond the limits of peculiar methodological approaches, I have tried to locate creativity as a reading 
dimension and as a speciﬁc process in desining social research. Epistemological and methodological 
frameworks are central in a discussion of knowledge production. ey contribute to understand the use 
of creativity along the distinction I have borrowed from Chomsky (1964). Surveys constructed to control 
hypotheses are oriented by the knowledge codiﬁed by the scientiﬁc community. is initial predisposition 
appears in a more subtle way even when the researcher uses a qualitative approach. In this paragraph I do not 
argue that qualitative approaches are superior to quantitative ones. Rather I critically analyse some diﬀerences 
between them; diﬀerences that are oen well used in order to best exploit the potential of both of these 
approaches by a triangulation14 of diﬀerent techniques.
A discriminating factor in choosing an approach is based on the level of the existing knowledge pertaining
to a particular phenomenon. If the researcher can describe that portion of reality in a satisfying manner, she
or he could consider his knowledge as suﬃcient and set a structured tool for information collection. On
the contrary, when she or he does not have – for any reasons – a level of knowledge that allows her or him
to describe a speciﬁc portion of reality, she or he cannot use a structured tool, but she or he ﬁrst needs to
experience that reality.
e quantitative approach is characterized by rule-governed creativity, the qualitative one by rule-changing
creativity: these are two models of creativity that the Chomskian vision links to a set of rules. us in the
ﬁrst case the creation of the tools by which the researcher collects information is submitted to a set of rules
related to substantial and procedural competences. In the second case the creative phase does not have a place
in the creation of a tool, but rather in a performance, that is to say in the modalities of inter-relationship
between individuals, through which the researcher comprehends the mental categories that people use to
give sense to their reality.
Another diﬀerence about creativity regards the phases of knowledge production during research design.
In the quantitative approach the creative phase is exhausted before going to the ﬁeld by a unilateral act of
the researcher. In the qualitative approach the creative phase is during the period in the ﬁeld, mainly because
it needs a continuing dialogic eﬀort between the researcher and the subjects involved. e characterisation
of research phases according to their degree of creativity puts emphasis on the superior ﬂexibility of the
qualitative approach that in the ﬁeld allows – by means of experience - for the consideration of unforeseen
cognitive ways out of the researcher’s categories.
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Notes
1 is argument is widely debated: Cf. Reichenbach’s classic distinction between context of discovery and context of
justiﬁcation (Reichenbach, 1951). For a perspective on qualitative approach, Cf. Schwartz and Jacobs (1979); Linstead
(1994); Maso (1995); Kelle (1995). For the quantitative approach, Cf. Coombs (1964); Corbetta (1999); Bruschi
(2005); Marradi (2007).
2 e emic/etic dyad was born and developed in the linguistic ﬁeld and aerwards enriched in the cultural anthropology
context. e ﬁrst conceptualization is due to the linguist Kenneth L. Pike (1954), who started the debate on the twin
category from 1954 (see also Headland, Pike and Harris, 1990). In this context, to follow an etic perspective means to
adopt the observer’s point of view using previous knowledge of the reference group to which one belongs. Instead, an
emic approach tries to achieve comprehension trough the category of the examined culture (see also Sacchetti, 2014).
3 Author’s translation.
4 By ‘tool’ I mean the medium between the researcher and reality which the researcher uses to collect information.
5 Here I am referring speciﬁcally to research that follows the hypothetical deductive model in the quantitative approach;
in this approach models diﬀerent from the hypothetical deductive one can be found, such as factor analysis or principal
component analysis, which I do not consider here. For those topics, Cf. Bruschi (1999); Corbetta (1999).
6 Author’s translation.
7 Sensitivity is a property of the modalities through which a variable is codiﬁed, e.g. the same variable could be
operationally deﬁned by three response modalities (less sensitive) or by ﬁve (more sensitive). See also Marradi, (1993).
8 Author’s translation.
9 For the issue of simulation in social science Cf. Moretti (1999; 2005)
10 Author’s translation.
11 Author’s translation.
12 'eory-ladenness' means loaded with theory. e expression 'theory laden' refers to observations and perceptions. 
13 For a perspective on abduction see Peirce (1960); Eco and Sebeok (1988); Sacchetti (2012).
14 In the social sciences the term triangulation is usually adopted to mean the use of more than one technique, coordinated
inside the same research project, to collect information about the same phenomenon.
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